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THE DISPUTE ON THE HORIZON:   
CONTRACTING FOR EFFECTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
A U.S. PERSPECTIVE* 
 




The importance of the relationship between the United States and Brazil in respect 
of international trade and commerce cannot be overstated.  In 2009 alone, U.S. exporters 
exported to Brazil merchandise with an aggregate value of USD $26,095,455,340, more 
than twenty-six billion U.S. Dollars.1  And Brazilian exporters exported to the United 
States merchandise with an aggregate value of USD $20,069,606,594.2  From oil & gas, 
transportation equipment, and chemical products to coffee, paper, and cachaça, 
international trade between the United States and Brazil is robust and voluminous.  As 
barriers to trade fall, more and more Brazilian entities and U.S. entities will seek good 
opportunities for investment and other ways to engage in mutually beneficial business 
transactions.   
When companies enter into business relationships across borders, both parties 
usually expect good things to happen.  Depending on the nature of the transaction and the 
role to be played by each party in their relationship, whether as buyer or seller, licensor or 
licensee, principal or agent, or some other role, the parties might be expecting new 
markets; new investors; new technology; or other new opportunities.  And each party 
understandably expects to profit in some way from the business relationship.  Sometimes 
things go very well and everyone is happy. 
But those successful cross-border business relationships can lull the unwary into a 
false sense of security, because sometimes things do not go well.  Sometimes 
contingencies – both foreseen and unforeseen – materialize that cause at least one of the 
parties to suffer significant losses.  Or sometimes a misunderstanding can cause the 
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relationship to deteriorate in such a way that the parties no longer expect good things to 
happen.  Such losses and such misunderstandings can lead to disputes. 
It goes without saying that disputes of any kind are generally undesirable from a 
business perspective.  Disputes cause delay; disputes cost money; disputes ruin business 
relationships.  But international disputes can be especially difficult.  In addition to all of 
the hardship associated with an ordinary, domestic dispute, now the parties to the dispute 
must contend with foreign discovery, foreign legal proceedings, potentially applicable 
bodies of international law, language barriers, cultural differences, and the logistical 
difficulties of dealing with a dispute that may be taking place on the other side of the 
planet. 
For these reasons and others, the simple truth is that no amount of planning for 
dispute resolution can assure that disputes that arise in international business transactions 
will be easy or inexpensive to manage or resolve.  But there are some important issues 
that should be considered and addressed ex ante – that is, before the parties enter into a 
contract and before they begin to conduct business with each other – by the parties to any 
cross-border transaction.  As relates to dispute resolution, there are three related but 
distinct items that can and should be addressed in this regard in every international 
contract involving U.S. parties or U.S. law.  First is choice of law; second is choice of 
forum; and third is method of dispute resolution.  Addressing those issues ex ante can 
help to reduce the risk that a cross-border dispute will spiral out of control and drag the 
parties into an international vortex from which neither party will easily emerge. 
Unfortunately, often companies engaging in these transactions (and sometimes 
their lawyers as well) fail to think about these issues until it is too late.  The issues are 
consequently not resolved at the time of entry into the agreement and are therefore not 
addressed by written contract, and when a dispute arises, the parties are no longer capable 
of reasonable agreement on establishing parameters for dispute resolution, preferring 
instead to seek whatever advantages can be gained by selecting each party’s home 
jurisdiction or by jockeying for application of advantageous bodies of law.  That leads to 
races to the courthouse, claims filed concomitantly in different jurisdictions, and an 
inability to agree on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that both parties might 
have initially found preferable.  An effective, thoughtful transactional lawyer can help to 
avoid this outcome. 
When advising their clients at the beginning of a proposed business relationship, 
transactional lawyers are often focused on getting the deal done.  They might focus on 
making their clients aware of certain risks, obligations or potential consequences that a 
proposed relationship might present.  They might focus on identifying creative solutions 
that allow both sides to find an acceptable compromise on some allocation of risk or 
responsibility.  But they should also be thinking at the beginning of the business 
relationship about how the relationship might deteriorate, or how an unexpected 
contingency might materialize, or how a dispute or disagreement could arise, and, 
importantly, what rules and procedures should be agreed upon, at the time the contract is 
entered into, to govern that dispute or disagreement, so as to avoid the cost of 
establishing those rules when the parties are no longer interested in cooperating with each 
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other.  Indeed, one very important role of any transactional lawyer is to consider and 
address how best to deal with disputes which the parties did not anticipate.  This is a 
challenging role to do well, made doubly so in the cross-border context.   
This article offers a view – from a U.S. perspective – on planning for dispute 
resolution in the context of business transactions between U.S. and non-U.S. parties.  
More specifically, this article identifies the issues that parties who are located in Brazil or 
in jurisdictions throughout the Americas should consider at the time of drafting, 
negotiating and finalizing business contracts with U.S. counterparties, or that are entered 
into in connection with other cross-border arrangements that could involve U.S. law, 
even when there is no U.S. counterparty, to prepare for effective management of disputes 
as they arise.  Specifically, this article briefly describes choice of law, choice of forum, 
and method of dispute resolution from a U.S. perspective, and it describes some of the 
issues that arise with respect to drafting and enforcing the appropriate contract language 
to address each item. 
II. CHOICE OF LAW 
Due to the complexities of cross-border transactions and the additional issues 
such transactions present, there is greater risk involved when parties fail to take the time 
to reduce their agreement into a comprehensive written contract.  By allocating in writing 
risk and responsibility in ways that both parties find mutually acceptable, the parties 
reduce the risk of misunderstanding and disagreement down the road.  But it is 
impracticable to expect to include every possible term in any written contract, and a 
choice-of-law clause therefore serves as a proxy for those terms the parties do not 
consider or simply do not take the time to address in writing.   
If, on the other hand, the parties fail to select the law that will govern their 
transaction, then a court or a tribunal surely will, and the court or tribunal might select a 
body of law that is undesirable and that, in any event, is unpredictable, making 
performance of the contract more difficult and effective management of the risks relating 
to the transaction nearly impossible.  It is therefore essential to include a carefully 
considered express choice-of-law clause in the written agreement between the parties. 
A. Choice of Law Generally 
As an initial matter, it is important to consider the limits from a U.S. perspective 
of the effect of a choice-of-law clause.  When a written contract includes an express 
choice-of-law clause that chooses the laws of a particular jurisdiction to govern the 
agreement, it is important to recognize that the parties have not chosen a body of law that 
will in all cases trump or supersede other potentially applicable bodies of law.  In the 
United States, as in other jurisdictions, some statutes (or other sources of law) that apply 
by their terms to one or both of the parties or to the transaction itself might continue to 
apply automatically, notwithstanding any choice-of-law clause selecting some other body 
of law to govern the contract between the parties. 
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By way of example, in the United States, there is a robust body of competition 
law called the Sherman Antitrust Act that prohibits certain restraints on trade.3  Among 
other things, competitors are generally prohibited by the Sherman Antitrust Act from 
allocating markets between themselves and from fixing prices.  If a U.S. company enters 
into a lawful agreement, such as a joint development agreement, with a foreign 
competitor, and the parties select by a choice-of-law clause the laws of Perú to govern 
their agreement, they have not cleverly evaded application of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
and will not be able to avoid the consequences under the Sherman Antitrust Act if they 
then proceed to allocate markets and fix prices between them by means of that otherwise 
lawful agreement.4  The Sherman Antitrust Act cannot be excluded by operation of a 
choice-of-law clause and will still apply by its terms.  Similarly, a choice-of-law clause 
generally will not enable parties to avoid application of otherwise applicable U.S. 
regulatory requirements or U.S. consumer protection statutes.5 
Of course, this does not mean that it is pointless in the United States to choose the 
body of law that is to govern the agreement.  When the choice-of-law clause is 
enforceable, and that is not always a foregone conclusion, a choice-of-law clause 
accomplishes primarily four things in the United States. 
First, by including an enforceable choice-of-law clause, the parties affirmatively 
select the rules that will be used to understand the agreement, including by means of 
interpreting or explaining existing contract language.  The law will provide rules 
regarding the evidence that can be considered to supplement the agreement; for example, 
is extrinsic evidence allowed to explain or supplement the agreement, or is such evidence 
prohibited?  The law may prescribe the meanings to give certain specific terms; for 
example, what does “F.O.B. plant of manufacture” mean, if the parties have included that 
shipment term in their written agreement?  And how does that term allocate risk and 
responsibility between the parties?  As well, the law will provide the rules of 
interpretation that will be used to interpret contract language that may be unclear. 
Second, an enforceable choice-of-law clause identifies the body of law that will 
be used to fill the gaps of the agreement.  The parties are not going to address in any 
written agreement every possible contingency and every possible risk that could 
conceivably arise; that would be too costly and too time-consuming.  So, for example, 
how would applicable law allocate the risk of some contingency that materializes that the 
parties did not specifically anticipate?  What would applicable law establish as a 
reasonable notice period, if the parties did not specify how much advance notice should 
                                               
3 Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”). 
4 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19, 105 S. Ct. 
3346, 3359 n.19 (1985) (noting that the Court did not need to consider the risk, which had not yet 
materialized, that a Japanese arbitration panel might use a choice-of-law clause to determine that U.S. 
antitrust law was inapplicable, but noting that “in the event that choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses 
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust 
violations, [the Court] would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”). 
5 See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (governing written warranties and 
service contracts offered in connection with sales of consumer goods). 
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be given when notice is required?  What are the default obligations, such as warranty 
obligations or indemnification obligations, that the law will imply into the agreement 
between the parties?  What steps must be taken (if any) before a claim may be filed by 
one party against the other that arises from the contract or its performance? 
Third, an enforceable choice-of-law clause identifies the body of law that will 
determine the remedies that are available for breach and that will establish statutes of 
limitations and affirmative defenses and the like.  For example, in the United States the 
default rule regarding attorneys’ fees is that each party bears its own cost of attorneys’ 
fees, unlike the default rule in many other jurisdictions, where the prevailing party may 
recover from the other party the prevailing party’s cost of attorneys’ fees. 
Fourth, at least to some extent, the parties might displace undesirable law 
governing how each party is required or is permitted to interact with the counterparty, if 
such law would otherwise be applicable under the court or tribunal’s choice-of-law 
principles. 
So, while choice of law does not affect every allocation of risk and responsibility 
and does not eliminate every potentially applicable statute or other body of law, choice of 
law does matter. 
B. Choosing a U.S. Jurisdiction 
Suppose that the parties agree that U.S. law will govern the agreement.  When it 
comes to identifying the body of U.S. law that will govern a contract used for an 
international business transaction, it is not enough to state that the laws of the United 
States will govern the contract.  Rather, within the United States, the law of contracts, 
commercial law, and corporate law are all largely supplied by individual states.  In other 
words, the State of New York has its own bodies of contract, commercial and corporate 
laws, the State of California has its own bodies of law, the State of North Dakota has its 
own bodies of law, and so on.  Therefore, when parties to contracts that are to be 
governed by some body of U.S. law choose the law that will govern the contract, they 
should specifically choose the laws of an individual state.  There are fifty states in the 
United States, and there is also the District of Columbia and there are several U.S. 
territories, so there are many potentially applicable bodies of law when a U.S. party is 
involved in a transaction or U.S. law is otherwise implicated by the transaction. 
i. Uniform Laws in the United States 
For some kinds of transactions, which state’s law governs the transaction will not 
make much difference.  For example, for commercial transactions, and in particular for 
sale of goods transactions, there is a uniform law in the United States known as the 
Uniform Commercial Code6 that has been adopted throughout the United States by every 
                                               
6 The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter UCC] has been widely adopted into the law of the states of 
the United States.  Article 2 of the UCC generally applies to all transactions in goods.  See U.C.C. § 2-102 
(2002).  Because Article 2 of the UCC defines “goods” quite broadly and without significant carve-outs, 
the scope of UCC Article 2 is very broad: 
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single state other than the State of Louisiana.  Thus, if a transaction is a sale of goods 
transaction that is to be governed by domestic U.S. law, it probably will not matter all 
that much for the commercial aspects of the transaction, if it is governed by the laws of 
Alabama, New York, Texas, Wisconsin, or any other state, with the sole exception of the 
State of Louisiana.7  It will not matter all that much because in each case, the transaction 
will be governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted by the applicable state, and as it is 
supplemented by that state’s common law.8 
ii. Corporate Law 
At the same time, for transactions implicating corporate law, it is common in the 
United States simply to choose the laws of the State of Delaware, the state within the 
United States that is the leader in the development of U.S. corporate law and the forum of 
choice for high-stakes corporate litigation.9  Many domestic and multinational companies 
in the United States are organized under the laws of the State of Delaware or have a 
parent company or a holding company that is organized under the laws of the State of 
Delaware.  The corporate laws of Delaware are generally considered to be well-
developed and reasonable.  It is therefore common for a corporate transaction to be 
governed by Delaware law, at least when there is some relationship between at least one 
of the parties or the transaction itself and the State of Delaware, which will often be the 
case for corporate transactions. 
iii. Differences among U.S. Jurisdictions 
So, in some cases the state selected by the choice-of-law clause might not matter, 
and in other cases, the state to be selected might be a foregone conclusion. 
On the other hand, for other transactions, choosing the laws of a particular state 
can have significant consequences.  For example, some states within the United States 
                                                                                                                                            
“Goods” means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time 
of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, 
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.  “Goods” also includes the unborn young of 
animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the section 
on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107). 
U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2002).  Article 2 of the UCC has been adopted by every state throughout the United 
States, other than by the State of Louisiana, making Article 2 of the UCC the primary domestic sales law in 
the United States. 
7 The State of Louisiana is unique among the fifty states in that Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, so it 
presents a host of differences from other states of the United States.  For that reason, U.S. practitioners 
outside of Louisiana tend to avoid choosing the laws of Louisiana to govern their clients’ transactions. 
8 See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2010) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform 
Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to 
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, 
bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.”) (brackets in original). 
9 See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW 447, 
450 (2008) (describing Delaware as “the preeminent source of corporate law in the United States”); see 
also Jens Dammann and Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 
1, 57 (2008) (“Delaware is currently the preeminent forum for high-stakes corporate litigation.”). 
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offer varying degrees of protection to distributors or sales representatives, or both,10 and 
it is possible to cause a protective statute to apply by a choice-of-law clause when the 
protective statute would not have otherwise applied by its terms.  Also, enforcement of 
restrictive covenants is approached very differently by different states within the United 
States.  A covenant not to compete might not be enforceable at all under one state’s laws 
and might be fully enforced under another.  The State of California, for example, is 
generally much less permissive of covenants not to compete than other states and, with 
limited statute-based exceptions, typically refuses to enforce covenants not to compete.11 
In addition, some states allow applicable statutes of limitations periods to be 
reduced by contract, while others do not.  And different states within the United States 
provide for different rates of interest to accrue on default judgments.  And so on.  So the 
U.S. jurisdiction that is selected by the choice-of-law clause can matter a great deal.  
Brazilian entities and persons and other non-U.S. parties dealing with U.S. law should 
know that the U.S. jurisdiction that is selected can matter, at least for some issues. 
iv. Limits on Freedom of Contract 
Notwithstanding the freedom of contract generally enjoyed within the United 
States, however, U.S. parties in domestic transactions are not free simply to select 
whatever jurisdiction they wish to select.  Suppose that two parties to a business 
transaction are located in Florida and California, respectively, and both parties refuse to 
agree to the other party’s jurisdiction as the jurisdiction whose law will govern the 
agreement.  In an attempt to compromise, we can imagine that the parties might select 
some neutral, third state, with which neither party has any connection, as the state whose 
laws will govern the transaction.  Perhaps the parties choose the laws of the State of 
Texas as a compromise, for the specific reason that neither party has any connection with 
Texas.   
While this sort of compromise may be a common compromise in some regions of 
the world, in some states within the United States, as between U.S. contracting parties, 
such a choice-of-law clause will generally be unenforceable due to a lack of nexus with 
the chosen state.  That is, in general there must be some relationship between the 
transaction and the jurisdiction selected, or some courts in the United States are unlikely 
to enforce the parties’ choice of law.12  This is due to the fact that in the United States, 
there are limits, established on a state-by-state basis, on the parties’ freedom to choose 
the jurisdiction whose laws will govern their transaction. 
                                               
10 See, e.g., Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, WIS. STAT. § 135.01 et seq. 
11 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (“Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which 
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void.”). 
12 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 671.105(1) (2009). 
Except as provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and 
also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such 
other state or nation will govern their rights and duties.  Failing such agreement, this code applies 
to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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C. Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws 
While the limits are determined on a state-by-state basis, more states follow some 
version of the approach set forth in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws than any 
other approach.13  Under that approach, courts may refuse to enforce a choice-of-law 
clause under two limited circumstances:  first, when there is no reasonable basis for the 
parties’ choice, and second when application of the chosen law would violate a 
fundamental public policy of another jurisdiction with materially greater interests in the 
dispute.14  And when the parties have no relationship with the state selected, courts in 
most U.S. jurisdictions will conclude that there is no reasonable basis for the parties’ 
selection, making the selection unenforceable. 
Jurisdictions within the United States that do not follow the approach described in 
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws follow one of a small handful of other 
approaches to determine whether or not to enforce the parties’ choice of law.  Irrespective 
of the approach used by any given court, if the court concludes that the parties’ choice of 
law is unenforceable, the court will use its own conflict-of-laws principles to determine 
which body of law the court will apply to govern the transaction and the dispute.  And the 
law selected by the court might be the law of the jurisdiction where the court is located, 
but it will not necessarily be the law of that jurisdiction.  That makes the applicable body 
of law uncertain even when there is a choice-of-law clause, if the choice-of-law clause is 
unenforceable. 
Now, whether the same limits on choice of law would apply to parties to an 
international transaction is an unresolved question.  There is precedent to suggest that 
U.S. courts will allow greater freedom to choose the laws of a neutral jurisdiction when 
the transaction is international.  But that question has not been definitively resolved by 
U.S. courts.  And there is at least a risk that some courts within the United States would 
not enforce a choice-of-law clause even in an international transaction when the choice-
of-law clause chooses the laws of a neutral jurisdiction, unless the parties can show some 
                                               
13 Restatements of the Law, including the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, are produced by the 
American Law Institute, an independent organization in the United States made up of lawyers, judges, and 
law professors.  http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview.  The Restatements are produced 
in an effort to explain what the law is, but the Restatements are not themselves binding law.  They 
nevertheless have considerable influence on the decisions of U.S. courts. 
14 The Second Restatement provides in relevant part as follows: 
(1)  The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be 
applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision 
in their agreement directed to that issue. 
(2)  The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be 
applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit 
provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either 
(a)  the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and 
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or 
(b)  application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy 
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination 
of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the 
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187. 
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relationship with that jurisdiction.  That risk appears to be quite small, but the risk does 
exist. 
D. Choice of New York Law 
However, choosing the laws of one particular state within the United States 
reduces the risk of non-enforcement, even in the absence of a relationship with the state, 
and that state is the State of New York.  In fact, it is very common for parties to 
international business transactions that are to be governed by U.S. law to choose New 
York as the state whose laws will govern the transaction.  And this is so whether or not 
the transaction has any relationship with the State of New York. 
The practice of choosing New York law to govern international business 
transactions is due to several things.  First, when U.S. lenders are involved in financing a 
transaction or a project, the lenders will often insist on New York law as the law that is to 
govern the contract documents.15  And this applies not only to those contract documents 
that relate directly to the contractual relationship between the lenders and the borrower, 
but also to contract documents entered into by the borrower with the third parties who 
will perform for the borrower.  U.S. lenders do this for a variety of reasons, including 
consistency and predictability, but they also do it to be confident that the security interest 
that the lenders take as protection against the risk of payment default will be recognized 
and enforceable – against all interested parties – under applicable law.  By consistently 
selecting New York law, the U.S. lenders reduce the risk of a security interest not being 
recognized or enforced. 
Second, even when U.S. lenders are not involved in the transaction, New York 
law often is selected nevertheless, because New York is a jurisdiction with which non-
U.S. parties to international transactions simply tend to be more comfortable, perhaps due 
to familiarity with New York, perhaps due to past experience, perhaps due to a perception 
that New York is a relatively sophisticated jurisdiction, perhaps for other reasons.  
Regardless of the reasons, non-U.S. parties tend to agree to New York law more readily 
than to the laws of other, unfamiliar states. 
In fact, New York has a reputation for highly developed commercial law and 
finance law.16  In some respects, New York seems to be emerging as the U.S. jurisdiction 
that is for commercial law and finance law what the State of Delaware is for corporate 
law. 
In any event, New York is a jurisdiction whose legislature, courts, practice 
community, and legal institutions are generally familiar with the complexities of 
                                               
15 See generally Kimmo Mettälä, Governing-Law Clauses of Loan Agreements in International Project 
Financing, 20 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 219 (1986). 
16 When New York enacted New York General Obligations Law Section 5-1401, discussed infra, it 
specifically “sought to secure and augment its reputation as a center of international commerce.”  Lehman 
Brothers Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 
118, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution To a 
Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 KANSAS LAW REVIEW 471, 497-98 (1989)). 
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international transactions, making it an arguably sensible choice for international 
transactions. 
But there is also a statutory basis for the selection of New York law.  There is a 
New York statute that provides that “The parties to any contract, agreement or 
undertaking … may agree that the law of [New York] shall govern their rights and duties 
in whole or in part, whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a 
reasonable relation to [the state of New York],” as long as the contract, agreement or 
undertaking involves a transaction covering at least $250,000 US Dollars.17 
Certain kinds of transactions or relationships are excluded from the scope of the 
statute.  The statute does not apply to contracts for labor or personal services, or to 
contracts relating to any transaction for family or household services, for example.18  
Other than some limited exclusions, however, the statute makes it clear that, from New 
York’s perspective, parties may choose the laws of New York to govern their transactions 
whether the parties and the transaction have a relationship with the State of New York or 
not. 
Remember, this is contrary to traditional conflict-of-laws principles in the United 
States.  The New York statute therefore creates an issue regarding whether courts will 
ignore their traditional conflict-of-laws principles in deference to the New York statute, 
or will instead defer to their own conflict-of-laws principles and not allow parties who 
have no reasonable relationship with the State of New York nevertheless to choose that 
state’s law. 
There is little doubt that New York courts will defer to the New York statute, in 
the absence of constitutional restrictions on such deference.  To the extent that the statute 
has been squarely addressed by courts in New York, the statute has been upheld.19  The 
                                               
17 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1) (emphasis added).  Paragraph 1 of the New York statute provides in 
its entirety as follows: 
1.  The parties to any contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or otherwise, in consideration 
of, or relating to any obligation arising out of a transaction covering in the aggregate not less than 
two hundred fifty thousand [U.S.] dollars, including a transaction otherwise covered by subsection 
one of section 1-105 of the uniform commercial code, may agree that the law of this state shall 
govern their rights and duties in whole or in part, whether or not such contract, agreement or 
undertaking bears a reasonable relation to this state.  This section shall not apply to any contract, 
agreement or undertaking (a) for labor or personal services, (b) relating to any transaction for 
personal, family or household services, or (c) to the extent provided to the contrary in subsection 
two of section 1-105 of the uniform commercial code. 
Id.  Subsection (2) of Section 1-105 of the UCC, as adopted by the State of New York, provides:  “Where 
one of the following provisions of this Act specifies the applicable law, that provision governs and a 
contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) 
so specified: [statutory references omitted].”  N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 1-105(2). 
18 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1). 
19 See, e.g., Lehman Brothers Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals Trading 
Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 118, 135-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Supply & Building Co. v. Estee Lauder International, 
Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8136 (RCC), 2000 WL 223838, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000); Bank of America 
National Trust and Savings Association v. Envases Venezolanos, S.A., 740 F. Supp. 260, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (ruling that when a contract is for more than USD $250,000 and contains a choice-of-law provision 
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more difficult question is whether courts of other states within the United States would 
ignore their conflict-of-laws principles and allow parties to choose New York law even in 
the absence of a relationship with the State of New York.  In other words, what would 
courts in California or Delaware or any other state do, when the conflict-of-laws 
principles of those other states normally would not allow the parties to choose New York 
law? 
There is little case law to date, and the question remains largely unresolved.  But 
to the extent that U.S. courts outside of New York have considered the effect of the New 
York statute, those courts have deferred to it and, accordingly, have recognized and 
enforced choice-of-law clauses choosing the laws of New York under the New York 
statute.20  It seems likely that U.S. courts outside of New York will continue to do so, 
even when there is no nexus with the State of New York, especially when the transaction 
is an international transaction.21 
E. Excluding Conflict-of-Laws Principles 
Whatever jurisdiction is selected, that jurisdiction will have both substantive laws 
and conflict-of-laws principles.  If a choice-of-law clause simply indicates that the 
contract is governed by the laws of New York or some other state and says nothing more, 
then some U.S. courts will generally begin their analysis by applying the selected state’s 
conflict-of-laws principles.  The conflict-of-laws principles are, after all, part of the law 
of the selected state.  And the selected state’s conflict-of-laws principles could lead to the 
application of the substantive laws of some other jurisdiction, which presumably would 
be an unintended consequence.  The choice-of-law clause should therefore be drafted to 
avoid that consequence by expressly excluding application of any conflict-of-laws 
principles.  Yet, choice-of-law clauses in U.S. contracts often omit that important feature. 
F. The CISG 
Another important item relating to choice of law in the United States is that the 
United States is a party to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, or CISG.22  Brazil is not a party to the CISG – at least not 
                                                                                                                                            
designating New York law as the law governing disputes arising from the contract, the New York statute 
“mandates the enforcement of that choice of law provision”). 
20 See In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 354 B.R. 686, 690-91 (D. Del. 2006) (enforcing a choice-of-law clause 
choosing the law of New York despite an argument that none of the parties nor the transaction itself had 
any connection or contact with New York); see also International Business Machines Corp. v. Bajorek, 191 
F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1999); Santa Fe Pointe, LP v. Greystone Servicing Corp., No. C-07-5454 MMC, 
2009 WL 1438285, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2009); McAllister Software Systems, Inc. v. Henry Schein, 
Inc., No. 1:06CV00093 RWS, 2008 WL 922328, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 2008); Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent 
Technologies, Inc., No. 6:04-cv-204-Orl-31DAB, 2005 WL 6125471, at *10-11 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2005). 
21 The State of California has adopted a statute that is very similar to New York’s; it allows the parties to 
choose California law even in the absence of any relationship with the State of California.  See CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1646.5.  For a variety of reasons, however, it is simply less common for practitioners (and their 
clients) outside of California to choose California law to govern an international contract than it is to 
choose New York law. 
22 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for signature April 
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 668 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG]. 
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yet.23  Venezuela and Bolivia and a number of other American states are also not yet 
parties to the CISG.24  But parties to a sale of goods transaction are free to opt into the 
CISG.  As well, many countries within the Americas are parties to the CISG, and 
additional countries are acceding to the CISG routinely.25  If the transaction is a 
transaction for the sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different 
countries and the countries are parties to the CISG, then in most cases the CISG will 
automatically govern the transaction, unless the parties effectively exclude its 
application.26  In many jurisdictions within the United States, this is likely to mean that 
the CISG must be specifically and expressly excluded.27 
Regardless, simply choosing the laws of New York or of any other state will not, 
by itself, be enough to exclude application of the CISG, as a matter of U.S. Constitutional 
law.  This is so because the CISG became part of the law of New York – and of every 
other state within the United States – as soon as it entered into force for the United 
States.28 
The U.S. Constitution makes all treaties made under the authority of the United 
States, including the CISG, “the supreme law of the land.”29  Because the CISG is self-
                                               
23 UNCITRAL, Status, 1980 – United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html 
[hereinafter CISG Status]. 
24 Id.  Venezuela was one of the original signatories of the CISG, but Venezuela has never ratified the 
CISG.  Because the CISG is subject to ratification, see CISG, supra note 22, art. 91, Venezuela is not a 
party to the CISG. 
25 Most recently, the Dominican Republic acceded to the CISG on June 7, 2010, and the CISG will 
therefore enter into force for the Dominican Republic on July 1, 2011, and Turkey acceded to the CISG on 
July 7, 2010, and the CISG will therefore enter into force for Turkey on August 1, 2011.  See CISG Status, 
supra note 23. 
26 CISG, supra note 22, arts. 1(1)(a), 6. 
27 See, e.g., Easom Automation Systems, Inc. v. Thyssenkrupp Fabco, Corp., No. 06-14553, 2008 WL 
1901236, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2008) (“Courts have held that parties can only opt out of the CISG if 
their contract explicitly states this fact.  Since neither the Plaintiff’s quote nor the Defendant’s Purchase 
Order contained an express provision opting out of the CISG, it is appropriate to apply it here.”) (citations 
omitted); Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, LLC, Civ. Action No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 WL 
754734, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008) (“Although the parties to a contract normally controlled by the 
CISG may exclude the applicability of the CISG to their contract, any such exclusion must be explicit.”). 
28 The CISG is a treaty that was signed by the executive on behalf of the United States and was ratified by 
the U.S. Senate, all in accordance with Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  Article II establishes the so-
called treaty power:  “[The President of the United States of America] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”  
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.   
29 See U.S. Const. art. VI.  Article VI provides in relevant part: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
See also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111(1) (“International 
law and international agreements of the United States are law of the United States and supreme over the 
law of the several States.”). 
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executing,30 the CISG requires no implementing legislation in order to become law 
within the United States; it automatically became law within the United States (and part 
of the supreme law of the land) upon its entry into force.31 
As part of the supreme law of the land, treaties made under the authority of the 
United States are binding on individual states within the United States.32  And as part of 
the supreme law of the land, such treaties preempt inconsistent state law.33  Indeed, 
treaties made under the authority of the United States are state law.34 
As a consequence, a choice-of-law clause expressly choosing the laws of the State 
of New York – or of any other jurisdiction within the United States – chooses as well the 
CISG, if the CISG by its terms is applicable to the contract, because the CISG is part of 
the law of the State of New York and of every other state and territory within the United 
States. 
Now, the CISG itself does not require express exclusion.35  But in order to be 
confident that the CISG has been excluded, it should be excluded expressly.  Of course, 
parties to an international transaction could always decide not to exclude the CISG, or 
even to opt into it when it otherwise would not apply, which they might decide to do for a 
variety of reasons, but that should be done consciously and intentionally, not as an 
accident. 
                                               
30 See Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State, to Ronald Reagan, President of 
the United States of America (Aug. 30, 1983), reprinted in U.S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, at vi (“The 
Convention is subject to ratification by signatory states (Article 91(2)), but is self-executing and thus 
requires no federal implementing legislation to come into force throughout the United States.”); see also 
Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing 
the CISG as a “a self-executing agreement between the United States and other signatories”). 
31 See Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State, to Ronald Reagan, President of 
the United States of America (Aug. 30, 1983), reprinted in U.S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, at vi; see also 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 458 (1888); Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111(3). 
32 See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 236 (1795) (holding that a treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land 
if any act of a state legislature stands in its way); see also Skiriotes v. State of Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73, 
61 S. Ct. 924, 927 (1941) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S. Ct. 290 (1900), and 
holding that “[i]nternational law is a part of our law and as such is the law of all States of the Union, but it 
is a part of our law for the application of its own principles, and these are concerned with international 
rights and duties and not with domestic rights and duties”), rehearing denied, 313 U.S. 599, 61 S. Ct. 1093. 
33 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111(1), §111 comment d.  
Some U.S. courts have recognized that the CISG preempts state law.  See, e.g., Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. 
Daros Int’l, Inc., Civ. Action No. 03-4821 (JAG), 2008 WL 4560701, at *2 n.4 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008) 
(“[T]he CISG, a treaty of the United States, preempts state contract law and common law, to the extent that 
those causes of action fall within the scope of the CISG.”). 
34 Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880) (“It must always be borne in mind that the 
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the law of every State as its own 
local laws and Constitution.  This is a fundamental principle in our system of complex national polity.”). 
35 See CISG, supra note 22, art. 6.  For a more thorough analysis, see William P. Johnson, Understanding 
Exclusion of the CISG: A New Paradigm of Determining Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 259-65 
(2011). 
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G. Choice-of-Law Practice Guidelines 
When negotiating with a U.S. counterparty or when negotiating a contract that 
involves significant U.S. interests, such as a project finance that is financed by U.S. 
lenders, there are several key points relating to choice of law. 
First, it is essential to include a carefully drafted choice-of-law clause to provide 
for predictability and certainty in respect of the body of law that governs the transaction. 
Second, even when an enforceable choice-of-law clause is included, there will be 
non-derogable statutes or laws that cannot be avoided by the choice-of-law clause. 
Third, some U.S. courts might refuse to enforce a choice-of-law clause if the 
parties are unable to show a relationship with the jurisdiction selected, although that risk 
is more remote for international transactions than it is for domestic U.S. transactions, and 
choosing New York law further reduces that risk. 
Fourth, it is important to exclude conflict-of-laws principles and also to remember 
the CISG and to include an express provision regarding its exclusion or application. 
H. Sample Contract Language 
Thus, a carefully drafted choice-of-law clause should include a carefully selected 
jurisdiction, whether that is the State of New York or some other jurisdiction, an 
exclusion of conflict-of-laws principles, and express treatment of the CISG, whether the 
decision is to exclude the CISG or for it to apply.  Thus, depending on the circumstances 
and the parties involved, a typical choice-of-law clause in an English-language contract 
when the parties have agreed to exclude application of the CISG might look something 
like the following: 
Choice of Law.  THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY 
AND INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF [THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK], U.S.A., WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY 
PRINCIPLES PERTAINING TO CONFLICTS OF LAWS.  THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (“CISG”) SHALL NOT 
GOVERN OR APPLY TO THIS AGREEMENT OR TO ANY SALE 
MADE UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, AND THE PARTIES HEREBY 
EXCLUDE APPLICATION OF THE CISG. 
 
And a typical choice-of-law clause in an English-language contract when the 
parties have agreed that the CISG will apply and will prevail over inconsistent domestic 
law might look something like the following: 
Choice of Law.  THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY 
AND INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF [THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK], U.S.A., WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY 
PRINCIPLES PERTAINING TO CONFLICTS OF LAWS.  IN 
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ADDITION, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(“CISG”) SHALL GOVERN AND APPLY TO THIS AGREEMENT 
AND TO ANY AND ALL SALES MADE UNDER THIS 
AGREEMENT.  IN THE EVENT OF ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 
CISG AND THE LAWS OF [THE STATE OF NEW YORK], THE 
CISG SHALL PREVAIL. 
 
III. CHOICE OF FORUM 
The body of law that governs a contract is an important issue, but an equally 
important, related issue is where disputes between the parties will be resolved.  If the 
contract is silent on that issue, then in an international transaction, the possibilities 
regarding where a dispute could be litigated can be enormous, making certainty regarding 
performance of the contract and predictably regarding dispute resolution virtually 
unattainable. 
Thus, transactional lawyers should counsel their clients to identify the location 
where disputes will be resolved by means of an express choice-of-forum clause, bearing 
in mind a number of important issues that arise in the U.S. context.   
A. Dual Court System 
Within the United States, there is a federal court system, and there is a separate 
state court system in each of the fifty U.S. states.  Each state court system has its own 
trial courts and a supreme court.  Some states also have intermediate appellate courts and 
specialty courts, such as tax courts, and feature other complexities.  The supreme court of 
each state is the final authority as to that state’s state law but is subject to the U.S. 
Supreme Court on federal questions.   
The federal court system consists of a U.S. Supreme Court, which is the highest 
court in the federal judiciary; twelve regional Circuit Courts of Appeals and one U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which are federal intermediate appellate courts; 
and 94 U.S. District Courts (i.e., trial courts), as well as bankruptcy courts and other 
specialty courts.36 
The location that is designated by the choice-of-forum clause could be a specific, 
named court, or it could refer to all of the federal U.S. courts in a particular jurisdiction or 
to the state courts in a particular jurisdiction, or it could simply refer to any appropriate 
court located in a named jurisdiction, which could be a county, a city, or a state. 
B. Jurisdiction in General 
When selecting the forum, the parties naturally must consider whether the 
selected forum will accept jurisdiction of the action.  In the United States, the party 
                                               
36 Additional information regarding how the U.S. federal court system is structured and how it functions is 
available at the following URL:  http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts.aspx. 
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bringing the claim must be able to show that the court where the claim is brought has 
jurisdiction to hear the claim by showing two things. 
i. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
First, the party bringing the claim must be able to show that the court has subject 
matter jurisdiction, or jurisdiction to hear the kind of claim that is being brought.37  Most 
state courts in the United States are courts of general jurisdiction and, depending on the 
amount in controversy and excluding some particular kinds of claims, will generally have 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear all kinds of justiciable claims.   
But U.S. federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with authority to hear 
only certain kinds of claims.  When the dispute arises from a transaction between a U.S. 
party and a non-U.S. party, however, there usually will be a statutory basis for 
jurisdiction in federal courts.  One basis for jurisdiction arises when the claim involves a 
federal question, and any claim that arises under a treaty – including the CISG – will 
involve a federal question.38  Another basis for jurisdiction arises when there is diversity 
of citizenship, including when one party is a U.S. citizen and the other party is foreign to 
the United States, as long as the value of the dispute exceeds USD $75,000.00.39  If the 
federal district courts have original jurisdiction, then even if the U.S. party files a claim in 
state court, the other party can remove the claim to federal court at its option.40  Foreign 
parties tend to view federal U.S. courts as more likely to be impartial than state courts, so 
cross-border disputes tend to be resolved in federal court. 
                                               
37 The plaintiff bears the burden of convincing the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court 
has jurisdiction.  See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S. Ct. 780 
(1936). 
38 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
39 The applicable statute provides as follows: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is 
between (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign 
state are additional parties … 
28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
40 The statute that provides for removal to federal court provides in relevant part as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought 
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, 
may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United 
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.  For 
purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious 
names shall be disregarded. 
 
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a 
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be 
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.  Any other such 
action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served 
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441. 
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ii. Personal Jurisdiction 
Second, in addition to subject matter jurisdiction, the party bringing the claim 
must be able to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the party against whom 
the claim is brought.  The general principle of law in the United States is that a court has 
power to exercise jurisdiction over a person if the person’s relationship to the state where 
the court is located is such as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable.41  
Once again, however, the standard is established on a state-by-state basis.   
There are certain traditional means of showing personal jurisdiction, including 
domicile or presence of that party in the jurisdiction, or other minimum contacts with the 
state.42  One way to obtain personal jurisdiction is by consent of the party against whom 
the claim is brought.43 
iii. Consent to Jurisdiction 
Because personal jurisdiction may be obtained by means of consent, consent to 
the jurisdiction of the selected forum can and should be given by contract by means of an 
express consent-to-jurisdiction clause.44  Even if consent is given, however, consent can 
also be revoked, if it is revoked before a claim is brought.  Therefore, consent to 
jurisdiction of the selected court or courts not only should be expressed in the contract, 
but also should be irrevocable, and it should survive termination or expiration of the 
agreement.  On the other hand, the consent-to-jurisdiction clause should also be clearly 
limited to claims arising from the agreement or its performance or enforcement. 
C. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 
Ultimately, the issue from a U.S. perspective is whether a U.S. court will enforce 
the forum selection clause if one party disregards the forum selection clause and brings 
an action in some other forum within the United States and the other party seeks to stay 
                                               
41 Restatement (2d) of Conflict of Laws § 24(1). 
42 Absent a traditional basis for jurisdiction (presence, domicile or consent), due process requires that the 
defendant have “certain minimum contacts with (the forum state) such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).  See also Restatement (2d) of Conflict of Laws § 27(1). 
43 See, e.g., National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316, 84 S. Ct. 411, 414 (1964) 
(stating that “parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court”); see 
also Restatement (2d) of Conflict of Laws §§ 27(1)(e), 32 and 43. 
44 A typical consent-to-jurisdiction clause appearing in an English-language contract might look something 
like the following: 
The parties hereby irrevocably consent to the [exclusive] jurisdiction of the state and 
federal courts situated within [__________] County, in the State of [___________] with 
respect to any and all claims arising from or relating to this Agreement or its performance 
or enforcement.  This section shall survive termination or expiration of this Agreement. 
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or remove the proceedings in that U.S. court on the basis of the forum selection clause.  
In that event, U.S. courts will generally enforce choice-of-forum clauses.45 
In fact, there is U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishing a broad freedom for 
parties in international transactions to have broad discretion to choose a neutral forum as 
their exclusive forum for resolution of their disputes.  The seminal case on this issue is a 
well-known decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Company.46 
The dispute at issue in the Bremen decision arose out of a significant towage 
contract entered into in order to get a drilling rig from the Gulf of Mexico to the Adriatic 
Sea.47  The owner of the rig, Zapata Off-Shore Company, an American corporation, 
invited bids for the towage, and Unterweser Reederei GmbH, a German corporation, 
submitted the low bid.48  Zapata awarded the project to Unterweser and requested a 
written contract from Unterweser.49  Unterweser submitted a draft written contract that 
contained the following clause:  “Any dispute arising must be treated before the London 
Court of Justice.”50  Zapata changed some of the terms but did not change the choice-of-
forum clause or the limitation-of-liability clause that was included in the draft agreement, 
signed it, and returned it to Unterweser.51  Unterweser accepted Zapata’s proposed 
revisions, and a contract formed.52 
Unfortunately for the parties, a storm at sea swept in; the elevator legs broke off 
the rig; and the rig was towed to Tampa, Florida, which was the nearest port of refuge.53 
Notwithstanding the choice-of-forum clause, Zapata sued Unterweser in a federal 
court in Tampa, alleging negligence and breach of contract.54  Unterweser filed a motion 
to dismiss and, in the alternative, to stay.55  In support of its motion, Unterweser invoked 
the forum selection clause contained in the parties’ written agreement, and Unterweser 
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction and that venue was improper under the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens.56  Following a complex series of motions, the trial court ruled 
that the U.S. district court in Tampa, Florida, had jurisdiction to hear the claim.57  The 
                                               
45 See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1916 (1972); Filanto, 
S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
46 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1907 (1972). 
47 See id. at 2-4, 92 S. Ct. at 1909-10. 
48 Id. at 2, 92 S. Ct. at 1909. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  There was also limitation of liability language purporting to limit Unterweser’s liability, and there 
were some other terms as well.  Id. 
51 Id. at 3, 92 S. Ct. at 1910. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 3-4, 92 S. Ct. at 1910. 
55 Id. at 4, 92 S. Ct. at 1910. 
56 Id.  The doctrine of forum non conveniens is a common law legal doctrine used primarily in the United 
States by which a court can refuse to exercise jurisdiction.  See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 
84 (“A state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action 
provided that a more appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff.”). 
57 407 U.S. at 4-7, 92 S. Ct. at 1910-11. 
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trial court’s ruling was upheld on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the federal intermediate 
court of appeals.58  However, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the courts below, 
and the trial court’s decision was vacated by the Court and remanded.59 
In reaching its decision, the U.S. Supreme court concluded that the trial court paid 
too little attention to the forum selection clause.60  And the court identified several 
reasons why the clause ought to be enforced in a complex international transaction like 
this, relating primarily to the complexity of international transactions and the need for 
comity among nations who are trading partners: 
There are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated private international 
agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening 
bargaining power, such as that involved here, should be given full effect.  
In this case, for example, we are concerned with a far from routine 
transaction between companies of two different nations contemplating the 
tow of an extremely costly piece of equipment from Louisiana across the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean, through the Mediterranean Sea to 
its final destination in the Adriatic Sea.  In the course of its voyage, it was 
to traverse the waters of many jurisdictions.  The Chaparral could have 
been damaged at any point along the route, and there were countless 
possible ports of refuge.  That the accident occurred in the Gulf of Mexico 
and the barge was towed to Tampa in an emergency were mere fortuities.  
It cannot be doubted for a moment that the parties sought to provide for a 
neutral forum for the resolution of any disputes arising during the tow.  
Manifestly much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both 
parties could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction in 
which an accident might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place 
where the Bremen or Unterweser might happen to be found.  The 
elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum 
acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international 
trade, commerce, and contracting.61 
 
The Court further reasoned that “[t]he expansion of American business and 
industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a 
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.”62 
One thing that is interesting and instructive in the Bremen decision is how little 
attention the parties gave to dispute resolution in their written contract.  The parties get 
the name of the English court wrong, referring to the “London Court of Justice” rather 
than to the “High Court of Justice in London.”  The contract lacks an express choice-of-
law clause.  And there is no express consent to the jurisdiction of the High Court of 
Justice in London.  In short, it offers an example of poor drafting.  Although the U.S. 
                                               
58 Id. at 7-8, 92 S. Ct. 1912. 
59 Id. at 20, 92 S. Ct. at 1918. 
60 Id. at 8, 92 S. Ct. at 1912. 
61 Id. at 12-14, 92 S. Ct. at 1914-15 (footnotes omitted). 
62 Id. at 9, 92 S. Ct. at 1912. 
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Supreme Court ultimately instructed the lower courts to pay greater deference to the 
clause, its terse, imprecise and incomplete nature undoubtedly contributed to a lack of 
certainty regarding the parties’ ex ante agreement to litigate in London, and ultimately 
almost certainly contributed to Zapata’s willingness to ignore and challenge the forum 
selection clause. 
Ultimately, the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Bremen decision shows 
the willingness of the Court to show great deference to the parties’ choice of forum in an 
international transaction.  Specifically, the Court held that a forum selection clause 
should be enforced in an international transaction unless the party seeking to avoid it can 
“clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was 
invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”63 
Now, Bremen involved an admiralty case and was limited by the U.S. Supreme 
Court to admiralty cases.  However, U.S. courts considering choice-of-forum clauses 
have largely, though not universally, followed the Bremen reasoning.64  And the U.S. 
Supreme Court expanded the Bremen holding when it subsequently applied the same 
analysis in a different case involving enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate in a 
designated forum.65  Thus, it is likely that U.S. courts will recognize and enforce choice-
of-forum clauses in contracts governing international business transactions.66 
D. Enforcement in the United States of Foreign Judgments 
If the parties select a court outside of the United States, including any court in 
Brazil, as the choice of forum, then the non-U.S. party should confirm that the U.S. 
counterparty has assets that are subject to seizure by the selected court.  Otherwise, any 
judgment rendered in favor of the non-U.S. party might not have much value, because 
U.S. courts will not be bound by and will not automatically enforce the judgment of that 
foreign court.  The United States is not a party to any international treaty that obligates 
U.S. courts to recognize or enforce the judgments of any foreign court, and U.S. courts 
will therefore enforce a foreign judgment only under limited circumstances, established 
on a state-by-state basis as a matter of state law. 
                                               
63 Id. at 15, 92 S. Ct. at 1916. 
64 See, e.g., Gita Sports Ltd. v. SG Sensortechnik GmbH & Co. KG, 560 F. Supp. 2d 432, 438 (W.D. N. 
Car. 2008); For an example of a decision by a U.S. court when the court refuses to uphold a choice of 
forum clause, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1985). 
65 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516, 94 S. Ct. 2449, 2455-56 (1974), rehearing denied 
(enforcing a forum selection clause providing for arbitration in Paris, France and reasoning that, in the 
absence of a forum selection clause, considerable uncertainty “will almost inevitably exist with respect to 
any contract touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and conflict-of-laws 
rules”). 
66 Recently the U.S. Supreme Court issued another decision demonstrating its willingness to defer to 
arbitration, in this case, in the employment context.  See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 
2772, 2779 (2010) (holding that a clause in an employment agreement delegating to an arbitrator the 
authority to decide whether the agreement was valid or invalid was enforceable). 
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E. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act 
It is not the case, however, that foreign judgments will never be enforced by U.S. 
courts.  On the contrary, a majority of U.S. jurisdictions have adopted a uniform law 
known as the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 (the “Act”).67  
And the Act generally provides for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
that grant or deny recovery of a sum of money, at least when the judgment is 
“conclusive.”68  However, there are situations when a judgment will not be conclusive: 
A foreign judgment is not conclusive [and therefore is not to be 
recognized under the Act] if (1) the judgment was rendered under a system 
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with 
the requirements of due process of law; (2) the foreign court did not have 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or (3) the foreign court did not 
have jurisdiction over the subject matter.69 
 
As well, there are other significant exceptions: 
A foreign judgment need not be recognized [but could be recognized in 
the court’s discretion if the judgment otherwise qualifies for recognition 
under the Act] if (1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court 
did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him 
to defend; (2) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (3) the [cause of 
action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to 
the public policy of this state; the judgment conflicts with another final 
and conclusive judgment; (5) the proceeding in the foreign court was 
contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in 
question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or 
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign 
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.70 
 
Thus, with the limited scope of applicability, the many exceptions, and the fact 
that numerous U.S. jurisdictions have not adopted the Act, uncertainty remains. 
                                               
67 The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 has been adopted by thirty-two 
jurisdictions in the United States, but it is in the process of being replaced by the Uniform Foreign-Country 
Money Judgments Recognition Act of 2005.  The replacement act is substantially similar to the 1962 Act.  
So far, the 2005 replacement act has been adopted by fourteen states and introduced in a fifteenth state. 
68 Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act §§ 2-3 (1962).  The 1962 Act provides in relevant part:  
“Except as provided in section 4, a foreign judgment meeting the requirements of section 2 is conclusive 
between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money.”  Id. at § 3.  And the 
1962 Act describes the foreign judgments to which the Act is to apply:  “This Act applies to any foreign 
judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is 
pending or it is subject to appeal.”  Id. at § 2. 
69 Id. at § 4. 
70 Id. 
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F. Other Issues 
Finally, when choosing litigation as the method of dispute resolution, there are 
several important items that should be considered from a U.S. perspective.  First, in light 
of Section II of this article, it is important to confirm that the selected forum will enforce 
the parties’ choice-of-law clause.  Second, in the United States there is a general right to a 
trial by jury.  If the non-U.S. party agrees to litigation in the United States, that party 
should consider whether it wishes to have a jury as the finder of facts.  If not, then it is 
imperative to include an express and conspicuous waiver of jury trial in the written 
agreement.  Third, the scope of discovery in the United States may be much broader than 
that to which the non-U.S. party is accustomed.  And fourth, service of process is likely 
to permit or require different steps in the United States.  It can be helpful to indicate by 
contract how service of process either may occur or must occur.71 
G. Choice of Forum Practice Guidelines 
When negotiating with a U.S. counterparty or when negotiating a contract that 
involves significant U.S. interests, there are several key points relating to choice of 
forum.   
First, it is essential to identify a suitable forum for resolving disputes and to 
include in the written contract a carefully drafted choice-of-forum clause, to provide for 
predictability and certainty in respect of the forum where disputes will be resolved. 
Second, it is important to confirm that the selected forum will accept jurisdiction 
and to include an express irrevocable consent-to-jurisdiction clause by which the parties 
consent to the jurisdiction of the selected forum, to increase the likelihood that 
jurisdiction will be accepted. 
Third, it is important to confirm that the parties’ choice-of-law clause will be 
enforced by the selected forum. 
Fourth, when selecting a forum located within the United States, the non-U.S. 
party should consider and address issues that are presented by selecting a forum in the 
United States, such as the right to a jury trial, the scope of discovery, and service of 
process. 
Fifth, when selecting a forum outside the jurisdiction where the other party has its 
assets, the non-U.S. party must be sure to determine in advance whether any judgment 
will actually have value by being enforceable in a jurisdiction where the other party has 
assets that could be seized to satisfy the judgment. 
                                               
71 The United States is a party to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638. 
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IV. METHOD OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION - ARBITRATION 
At least as important as choice of forum is selection of the method of dispute 
resolution.  The parties might decide that litigation is the preferred method.  But for a 
variety of reasons, the parties should at least consider alternative methods of dispute 
resolution and, in any event, should designate by contract the agreed-upon method of 
dispute resolution.  Of course, in the United States, as in other jurisdictions, the most 
obvious alternative to litigation is arbitration. 
A. The New York Convention 
The United States, like Brazil, is a party to the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, or the New York Convention.72  And the New 
York Convention has been made a part of U.S. law by means of the Federal Arbitration 
Act.73  Thus, courts in the United States are obligated to enforce agreements to arbitrate 
that arise from commercial relationships.74  And U.S. courts are obligated to recognize 
and enforce arbitral awards that are rendered pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate.75 
B. Agreement to Arbitrate 
If the parties effectively choose arbitration as the sole method of dispute 
resolution, and the U.S. counterparty attempts to resist arbitration, the non-U.S. party will 
be able to enforce the agreement to arbitrate in lieu of litigation, as U.S. courts are very 
likely to defer to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.76   
A significant decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., provides an especially good example of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s deference to an agreement to arbitrate.77  The case involved a Puerto Rican 
distributor (Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., or Soler), a Swiss automobile supplier 
(Chrysler International, S.A., or CISA), and a Japanese automobile manufacturer 
                                               
72 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 7, 1959) [hereinafter New York 
Convention]. 
73 Federal Arbitration Act § 1 et seq., 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208.  “The Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in 
accordance with this chapter.”  Id. at § 201. 
74 Article II, Paragraph 1 of the New York Convention provides as follows: 
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may 
arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, 
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 
75 Article III of the New York Convention provides:  “Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral 
awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the 
award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles.” 
76 See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S. Ct. 2449 (1974), rehearing denied. 
77 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985). 
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(Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, or Mitsubishi).78  Mitsubishi was formed as a result of a 
joint venture between CISA and a Japanese automotive company (Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, Inc.).79  The purpose of the joint venture was the distribution through Chrysler 
dealers outside the continental United States of vehicles manufactured by Mitsubishi and 
bearing Chrysler and Mitsubishi trademarks.80 
CISA appointed Soler as a distributor of Mitsubishi-manufactured vehicles within 
a designated territory.81  On the same date, CISA, Soler and Mitsubishi entered into a 
Sales Procedure Agreement.82  The Sales Procedure Agreement contained a mandatory 
dispute resolution clause providing for arbitration in Japan: 
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between 
[Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of 
this Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by 
arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of the 
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.83 
 
Initially, business was great and the parties were seemingly happy, but eventually 
sales slowed, which led to difficulties between Soler and the other parties.84  Mitsubishi 
brought an action against Soler in federal district court in Puerto Rico, seeking an order to 
compel arbitration in Japan in accordance with the dispute resolution clauses included in 
the Sales Procedure Agreement, which Soler opposed.85  Soler counterclaimed against 
both Mitsubishi and CISA, alleging numerous breaches of contract and asserting statutory 
causes of action, including a private cause of action under the Sherman Antitrust Act due 
to alleged antitrust violations.86 
The federal district court ordered arbitration of most of the claims, including the 
statutory claims arising from the alleged antitrust violations.87  The intermediate court of 
appeals reversed the district court, concluding that the antitrust claims were not 
arbitrable.88 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari “primarily to consider whether an 
American court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration 
when that agreement arises from an international transaction.”89  The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed the intermediate appellate court, concluding that “concerns of international 
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to 
                                               
78 Id. at 616-17, 105 S. Ct. at 3348-49. 
79 Id. at 616, 105 S. Ct. at 3348-49. 
80 Id. at 616-17, 105 S. Ct. at 3349. 
81 Id. at 617, 105 S. Ct. at 3349. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (brackets in original). 
84 Id. at 617-18, 105 S. Ct. at 3349. 
85 Id. at 618-19, 105 S. Ct. at 3349-50. 
86 Id. at 619-20, 105 S. Ct. at 3350. 
87 See id. at 620, 105 S. Ct. at 3350. 
88 See id. at 621-23, 105 S. Ct. at 3351-52. 
89 Id. at 624, 105 S. Ct. at 3352. 
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the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of 
disputes require” enforcement of the parties’ agreement, even if a different result would 
have been appropriate in a purely domestic context.90 
In so holding, the Court reasoned that, at its heart, the private cause of action 
under the antitrust laws is simply the recovery of damages.91  There is nothing to preclude 
an international litigant from seeking recovery of those damages by some means other 
than a court judgment, including arbitration.92  Thus, in the international context, a claim 
for money damages generally will be arbitrable, even when it arises from a statute of 
fundamental importance, and even if it would not be arbitrable in the domestic context.   
Notably, money damages are not the only remedy that might be desirable.  A 
party might seek an injunction or a determination as to ownership of property or some 
other non-monetary judgment.  And those remedies will not be awardable by an arbitrator 
in the United States.  Thus, even when mandatory and binding arbitration is selected by 
the parties as the sole and exclusive means of resolving disputes, it is important to retain 
the right by contract to seek other remedies in court when appropriate. 
C. Enforcement of an Arbitral Award 
If the parties include in their contract an agreement to arbitrate in an international 
business transaction, the agreement to arbitrate is therefore likely to be enforced by U.S. 
courts whenever the remedy sought by the aggrieved party is money damages.  Equally 
important, with some important but limited exceptions, any arbitral award that results 
from the arbitration is likely to be recognized and enforced by U.S. courts. 
The exceptions are largely reflected in two reservations that were entered by the 
United States when it ratified the New York Convention.  One significant reservation is 
that its courts will apply the New York Convention only to recognition and enforcement 
of awards made in the territory of a country that is a party to the convention.93  Brazil 
entered the same reservation upon its ratification of the New York Convention.94  The 
reservation is not a concern if the arbitration takes place in the United States or Brazil, 
because both countries are parties to the New York Convention.  If the parties choose a 
neutral location for the arbitration, however, the parties must be sure to choose a country 
that is a signatory to the New York Convention.95 
In addition, the United States entered a reservation that its courts will apply the 
convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships that are considered 
                                               
90 Id. at 629, 105 S. Ct. at 3355. 
91 See id. at 635-36, 105 S. Ct. at 3358-59. 
92 See id. at 636, 105 S. Ct. at 3359. 
93 UNCITRAL Status, 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html. 
94 Id. 
95 There are currently 144 parties to the New York Convention, including Brazil and the United States.  See 
id.  Notably, of the thirty-five member states of the Organization of American States, only five countries 
are not yet parties to the New York Convention.  Those countries are Belize, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, and Suriname.  All other OAS member states are parties to the New York Convention.  See id. 
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commercial under national law, which most business transactions are likely to be, for 
purposes of enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate.  Some matters might be determined 
not to be arbitrable, though if the remedy that is sought is money, then that is unlikely. 
D. Finality of Arbitral Award 
One potential benefit of mandatory arbitration from a U.S. perspective is the 
finality of the arbitral award.  The grounds upon which an arbitral award may be rejected 
by a court in the United States are very limited, and U.S. courts tend to avoid second 
guessing the arbitrators.  Therefore, assuming that most parties would rather avoid 
lengthy, costly, drawn-out appeals, binding arbitration might be preferable to protracted 
litigation. 
For U.S. courts, the limited grounds set forth in Article V of the New York 
Convention for refusing to enforce an arbitral award are exclusive with respect to arbitral 
awards made outside the United States.96  But with respect to awards made within the 
United States but that are nevertheless not considered to be “domestic” awards (because 
they have a relationship with a foreign state), additional grounds for refusing to enforce 
an arbitral award may be considered by U.S. courts by virtue of Article V(1)(e) of the 
New York Convention.97  Even so, those additional grounds are quite limited under 
domestic U.S. law. 
The bottom line is that if the parties agree to arbitrate, they should expect to be 
bound by the arbitrators’ decision.  The standard for refusing to enforce an arbitral award 
in the United States is very high.  It is not impossible to overturn an arbitral award, but it 
is not easy.  One poignant example of this is offered by a decision of the Second Circuit, 
Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.98 
In 1982, Toys “R” Us, Inc., a U.S. company that operates a network of toys and 
games franchises, entered into two agreements with Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, 
W.L.L., a Kuwaiti company, by which Toys “R” Us gave Alghanim the right to open and 
operate Toys “R” Us stores in several jurisdictions in Kuwait and the surrounding region, 
in fourteen countries altogether.99  Over the next eleven years, Alghanim opened four 
stores, all in Kuwait.100  According to Toys “R” Us, only one of those was an actual full-
fledged Toys “R” Us store.101  And in any event, the stores were wildly unsuccessful.102  
Toys “R” Us terminated the agreements by non-renewal, providing six months’ notice of 
its intent not to renew the parties’ License and Technical Assistance Agreement, thereby 
                                               
96 Article V of the New York Convention provides the exclusive grounds upon which recognition and 
enforcement of the arbitral award may be refused.  See New York Convention, supra note 72, art. V. 
97 A court may refuse to recognize and enforce an award upon a showing that “[t]he award has not yet 
become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country 
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”  New York Convention, supra note 72, art. 
V(1)(e). 
98 Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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terminating Alghanim’s right to operate as a franchisee.103  The parties then proceeded to 
attempt to negotiate termination of their relationship on terms that were mutually 
acceptable, but they were unable to do so.104  Alghanim offered to walk away for USD 
$2,000,000, but Toys “R” Us refused.105  Toys “R” Us proceeded to grant the franchise to 
two other companies, splitting up Alghanim’s territory between the two companies.106   
Toys “R” Us then invoked the mandatory arbitration clause included in the 
parties’ agreement and initiated arbitration proceedings before the American Arbitration 
Association, seeking a declaration that the License and Technical Assistance Agreement 
with Alghanim was properly terminated.107  Alghanim counterclaimed for breach of 
contract, and the parties’ claims went to arbitration.108  The arbitrator denied Toys “R” 
Us’s request for a declaratory judgment in its favor, finding that Alghanim had an 
absolute right under the termination provisions of the agreement to open toy stores even 
after being given notice of termination, as long as the last toy store was opened within 
five years.109 
Following substantial discovery, motions, and a 29-day evidentiary hearing, the 
arbitrator awarded Alghanim USD $46,440,000 – more than forty-six million US dollars 
– for lost profits under the agreement, plus interest, and Alghanim petitioned the district 
court to confirm the award under the New York Convention.110 
Toys “R” Us argued before the federal district court that the arbitral award should 
be vacated or modified, because it was “clearly irrational, in manifest disregard of the 
law, and in manifest disregard of the terms of the agreement.”111  However, the district 
court confirmed the award, finding Toys “R” Us’s objections to be without merit.112  
Toys “R” Us appealed.113 
Deferring to the arbitrator’s decision, the federal appellate court confirmed the 
decision of the district court.114  In so ruling, the court articulated strong deference for 
arbitral awards: 
The confirmation of an arbitration award is a summary proceeding that 
merely makes what is already a final arbitration award a judgment of the 
court.  The review of arbitration awards is very limited … in order to 




106 Id. at 17-18. 







114 Id. at 25. 
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avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling disputes 
efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation.115 
 
And while it is not the case that there is no review of arbitral awards in the United 
States, the standard for overturning an arbitral award is very high.  The Second Circuit 
explained that an arbitrator’s decision “is entitled to substantial deference, and the 
arbitrator need only explicate his reasoning under the contract in terms that offer even a 
barely colorable justification for the outcome reached in order to withstand judicial 
scrutiny.”116 
E. American Arbitration Association 
With respect to identifying the rules that will govern the parties’ arbitration, 
parties to international business transactions choose from among a variety of arbitration 
organizations.  Perhaps the best known arbitral center in the United States is the 
American Arbitration Association, or AAA.  The American Arbitration Association 
maintains a website with information regarding, among other things, its rules and 
procedures.117  Its International Rules can be found in several languages, including 
English and Portuguese.118 
F. Sample Contract Language 
Finally, depending on the circumstances and the parties involved, a typical clause 
that provides for mandatory and binding arbitration as the sole method of dispute 
resolution might look something like the following in an English-language contract 
governed by some body of U.S. law: 
Method of Dispute Resolution.  Except as otherwise expressly provided 
in this Agreement, any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or 
relating to this Agreement, its interpretation or enforcement, or the breach, 
expiration, termination or invalidity hereof, shall be submitted to 
mandatory and binding arbitration in ____________, ___________, 
administered by the [International Centre for Dispute Resolution of the 
American Arbitration Association] under its [International Arbitration 
Rules] then in effect (the “Rules”) by a [single arbitrator] [panel of three 
(3) arbitrators] appointed in accordance with the Rules.  The arbitral 
proceedings shall be conducted in the [English] language, and the 
arbitrator(s) must be fluent in [English] [and _________].  All documents 
not in [English] submitted by either party must be accompanied by a 
translation into [English].  Judgment upon the award of the arbitrator(s) 
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.  The award of any 
                                               
115 Id. at 23 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
116 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
117 http://www.adr.org/ 
118 The AAA International Arbitration Rules are available in English at the following URL:  
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994.  And the International Arbitration Rules are available in Portuguese 
at the following URL:  http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=34623. 
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such arbitration shall be final and binding on all parties and in lieu of all 
other remedies and procedures available to the parties, provided, however, 
that either party may seek preliminary injunctive or other interlocutory 
relief pursuant to this Agreement prior to the commencement of or during 
any such arbitration proceedings.  In the event of any default by Buyer 
under any of its monetary obligations under this Agreement, Seller shall 
have the right at its option to bring a claim in respect of such monetary 
default, in lieu of arbitration, in any court of competent jurisdiction 
located within the jurisdiction where Buyer has its principal place of 
business. 
 
It is possible to provide even greater detail than that which is provided in the 
sample contract language.  Whatever is not specified by contract will generally be 
provided by the applicable arbitration rules. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When a transactional lawyer understands the client’s business and understands the 
client’s appetite for risks, as well as the unique issues that can arise in an international 
business transaction, the transactional lawyer can help put in place a written contract that 
has the potential to help to avoid disputes in the first place.  The transactional lawyer can 
also help to reduce the costs of dispute resolution and to avoid unnecessary delay in 
resolving the dispute by establishing at the beginning of the relationship enforceable, 
mutually agreeable provisions regarding choice of law, choice of forum, and method of 
dispute resolution. 
As articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, contractual provisions “specifying in 
advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is … an 
almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability 
essential to any international business transaction.”119  The failure or inability to assure in 
advance predictability regarding dispute resolution, in the words of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, “would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil 
the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial 
agreements.”120  That risk can be greatly reduced through carefully drafted contracts that 
provide for effective dispute resolution. 
                                               
119 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516, 94 S. Ct. 2449, 2455 (1974), rehearing denied. 
120 Id. at 517, 94 S. Ct. at 2456. 
